Nineteenth Century Economic Change and the Crisis in the Southern Senegambia:

Islamic Militancy and the British Intervention in the Lower Gambia Region of Jarra, Kiang and Foni

1860-1888

Ensa Touray

University of Gambia, The Gambia

Author Note

Ensa Touray, History Lecturer, University of Gambia.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Ensa Touray, University of Gambia, Po Box 3530, Brikama Campus, The Gambia, 00220-7664805.

Contact: etouray@utg.edu.gm
Abstract

The global economic realities in the middle of the 19th century was characterized by the intense search for viable areas of cost effective production to facilitate the expansion of the capitalist world economy and the rate of accumulation. This period of transformation coincided with the period of industrialization of Western European countries and the introduction of cash crops in the southern Senegambia region. In this paper, I critically examine how capitalist economic advancement and transformation led to the rise of socio-political crisis in the southern Senegambia region. It is evident that the new emerging global capitalist economic expansion in the middle of the 19th century generated competition between the Muslims and non-Muslims in the entire southern Senegambia region. It explores the consequent large scale socio-political crisis resulting from the nineteenth century capitalist economic advancement that lead to the clash between the theocratic Muslim regime of Futa Jallon and non-Muslim Empire of Kabu. It further sets out to examine how global economic change and cash crop production in the middle of the nineteenth century created intense political consolidation and power struggle in Kiang, Jarra and Foni that necessitated the intervention of the British administration.

Keywords: Capitalist, Change, militant, Crisis, Mediation, consolidation
Introduction

The introduction of cash crops in 1860 gave Muslims and peasants living on both banks of the Gambia River access to cash and material mobilization to fight against oppressive non-Muslim kings (Wright, 2004). To understand the context of the crisis in the entire southern Senegambia region, it is significant to rationalize the realities of a global system within the framework of a capitalist world economic system in the middle of the nineteenth century that marked the beginning of global enterprise (William, 2005). This new global economic and commercial phenomenon brought transformation in wider context. It generated new commitment for political consolidation among the traditional ruling aristocracies. In addition, it enabled peasants and Muslim communities under the non-Muslim ruling regimes to engage in peanut production and trade to gain material wealth.

After the mid-19th century, a series of economic depressions experienced by industrial core nations as a result of overproduction enticed the European nations to compete for market and sources of raw material within non-industrial territories in West Africa. The competition among European nations for space and for the new economic and production system in the Senegambia, also correspondingly reproduced a new form of power consolidation and struggle for dominance (Barry, 1998).

Understanding of key structures of the capitalist world-system is relevant to the contextualization of crises in the entire south bank of the Senegambia in the late 19th century. The key hierarchical categories identified in the capitalist world-system were geographical based economic relationship. It is rationalized as a core-periphery relationship that engendered competition and political crises as a consequence of change in the production system (William, 2005). The changes in the production system in the south bank region of the Senegambia could
be linked to increasing outward expansion, industrialization, and commodification that did not only generate competition among core powers for hegemony over the whole system but reproduced struggle and competition among traditional rulers and Muslim clerics. This could be deemed as anti-systemic forces that required peaceful intervention of the British as an industrial core nation in the internal conflicts between the Muslims and traditional non-Muslim ruling dynasties in The Gambia. Significantly, the demand for vegetable oil and fat needed for industrial production in Europe also required the need for abolition of Atlantic slave trade in order to retain manpower for the new production system in Africa (Wright, 2004). This gave rise to the growth of a legitimate trading system. Owing to new development in the new production system, communities in or near coastal zones began to specialize in the production of peanut and palm kernel.

Conceptualizing the geo-political framework of the southern bank region of greater Senegambia is relevant in our understanding of transformation and change within the context of capitalist economic expansion. The south bank region was dominated by Kabu, a non-Muslim Mandinka empire, and Futa Imamate, dominated by Muslim Fulas. Both regimes played a central role in the Trans-Atlantic slave trading system from the period of the 17th to the early 19th century (Barry, 1998). The growth and the development of peanut production constituted labor migration and effective utilization of productive terrain along the strategic coastal zones in the entire south bank region of greater Senegambia (Web, 2004). Futa Jallon Imamate is situated on the mainland and was ecologically and geographically disadvantaged to monopolize the peanut production system because of the rocky nature of the soil. These conditions in the Futa Jallon plateau shape the basis of population migration into Kabu and Foria around River Grande and Geba (Barry, 1998). Therefore, the discourse on the conceptualization of crisis in Futa and Kabu can be
understood within the framework of a new emerging orientation towards export agriculture and relocation of productive terrain prior to colonial conquest (Webb, 2006).

Following the control of all the southern Rivers such as the Pongo, Nunez, Geba and Gambia Rivers as well as productive arable terrain strategic for European trading activities, Kabu continued to maintain an active position in the new production system. This requires an in-depth analysis of the outcome of structural transformation and change in the new global economic system on the political atmosphere in the southern Senegambia region. The viable and strategic southern region of Benty, Bova and Boke in Futa Jallon could have maintained active global participation of Futa’s theocratic regime in the legitimate trading system (Barry, 1998). However, with European occupation in these strategic and viable zones within the southwest region of Futa Jallon, the theocratic regime of Futa was determined to embark on territorial expansion through the province of Labe to ensure effective control over legitimate commodity and contraband slave trading.

It is also important to note that the introduction of a legitimate trading system through cash crop production led to relocation of labor and productive terrains within the jurisdiction under the political and administrative suzerainty of Kabu (Barry, 1918). Consequently, the strategic ecological and commercial conditions in the region of Kabu served as a pull factor for the incoming population. This caused the theocratic regime of Futa to experience drastic revenue shrinkage as a result of evacuation of a large number of Fulas to escape taxation and oppressive rule (Barry, 1998). In this situation, the crisis between two regional powers needs to be understood within the context of quest for political legitimacy and hegemony over labor and productive terrain. As for Barry, effective pursuit for political legitimacy by Futa Imamate was explored in terms of mobilization in human and material form to surmount the regional power and consolidation of
Kabu Empire. Accordingly, this was carried out within the framework of a triple military alliance. The Imam of the central regime of Futa raised a large number of armies, supported by combined forces Alfa of Labe and Almami of Bundu, Bbakar Saada attacked and exterminated the regional power of Kabu in 1868 (Gray, 1966).

The downfall of Kabu led to withdrawal of political suzerainty of the central regime of Kabu over the control of the entire upper and lower Gambian basin. Consequently, the provincial Mandinka ruling dynasties in the jurisdiction of lower Gambian basin of Kiang and Jarra re-asserted their territorial independence, and then consolidated their position to maintain their control over legitimate trading system. The Muslim clerics under the despotic non-Muslim regimes became ambitious for political change in the entire south bank region. The regional vulnerability and competition on the account of the crisis between the Muslims and the traditional ruling elites depicted the beginning of insecurity that would potentially disrupt agriculture and trade.

**Crisis in the South Bank of the Gambia: Islamic Militancy and Political Consolidation**

The ninetieth century capitalist advancement through legitimate trading system and political crisis in the entire Senegambia can be understood within the context of intense pursuit for socio-political reform. Donald Wright identifies it as “intense desire for change and the militant approach to bringing about that change (Wright, 2004). In the south bank region, Muslim militancy for political change was explored through intense mobilization in human and material form. The downfall of the Kabu empire created an opportunity for the growth of new Fulani kingdom known as Fulladu in the upper Gambia valley. The leading Mandinka Muslim clerics through ethnic alignment mobilized and hired the remaining Kabu warriors in the course of political change in the latter part of ninetieth century.
The Islamic militancy in the middle of the 19th century can be conceptualized within the framework of broader context of capitalist economic expansion. The Islamic uprising could be traced to Islamic brotherhood known as the Tijaniya Brotherhood. The brotherhood became appealing to the masses owing to its practical miracle mobilization within the context of ritual and mysticism. The leader of this brotherhood ideological sect was Ahaji Umar Tal, a Torobe Fulani from upper Senegal (Wright, 2004). According to Donald Wright, the reception of the Tijaniya doctrine through Shaykh Umar inspired a revolutionary spirit into Ma Bah to start a revolutionary campaign against the existing traditional authorities in the lower Gambia basin. “Shaykh Umar visited him, acquainted him with the Tijaniyya, and blew on the embers of Islamic revival that already may have been glowing within Maba.”

It should be noted that the middle of the nineteenth century was characterized by the demand for reform and rebellion against Soninke hegemony. The cash crop production and legitimate trading system brought competition between the Muslim clerics and Soninke regimes in the entire lower Senegambia region (Wright, 2004). Soninke refers to non-Muslims who follow traditional African religion.

Maba led the successful Jihad in the north bank region of Baddibu in 1861. Though Maba could not complete his conquest, his success in laying the foundation of Islamic militant uprising in the Gambia has been clearly captured by J M Gray: “His earlier successes in Baddibu and Nuimi were the signals for Marabouts up and down the river to rise against their Soninke overlord”

Kaba as a leading disciple of Maba, was motivated by the successes of his contemporaries like Alfa Molloh Baldeh in Fulladu and Foday Kombo Sillah in the south-west region of the Gambia. He mobilized prominent marauding warriors, who, according to oral traditions, were powerful. With the exception of “Franzwoi” and others based at Toniataba, the British records
could not indicate the names of his warriors. However, Manding speaking tradition has been able to mention his Mandinka warriors like Maisa Fatty, Bintou Mori, Fena Turuma and Demba Ajara. He also mobilized and made a joint alliance with a large confederacy of marabout. Then he consolidated his position in Niamina, Jarra, Kiang and Foni, in the region to the south of those districts as far as the Bank of Casamance. Practically, he administered only three districts which were isolated from each other. The three districts include the south of the Bintang Creek, Eastern Kiang and Western Jarra as well as part of Eastern Jarra (Gray, 1966).

With the emergence of regional dominance of Futa Imamate, viable kingdoms under the jurisdictions of Kabu in the upper Gambia were brought under the domination of Alfa Molloh. Fulladu initially became a periphery of Futa Imamate until 1878. Since Foday Kaba was constrained by the Fullani dominance in Fulladu, his determination to mobilize the remaining Kabu warriors to conquer viable lower Gambian kingdoms of Niamina, Jarra, Kiang and Foni pre-occupied his major agenda. It should be understood that the jurisdictions such as Jarra, Niamina and Kiang were administered by powerful centralized Manding speaking people with well-organized military structures for territorial defense and security. It is also very significant for us to understand that these kingdoms became viable for political consolidation as a result of peanut production, while robber and gum trade constituted the viability of Foni (Barry, 1996).
Kaba's conquest for territorial integration was negatively frustrated by intense political consolidation of centralized Manding speaking rulers of Jarra and Kiang. Geographically, his conquered districts were not territorially contiguous. In between his conquered districts, the Soninke kings of Japineh, Colley Dampha, king Mansa Kortoh of Batteling in the region of Kiang and Cory-Kunda, maintained their independence against Kaba (CSO, 1888). The ruling houses in Jarra and Kiang re-affirmed their political consolidation to benefit from legitimate trading. Therefore, relinquishing their territorial sovereignty would constitute the end of their dominant control over state revenue accrued from taxation paid by farmers and European traders. Since the establishment of Fulani domination led by Musa Molloh in Fulladu prevented Kaba in Fulladu, the kings in Kiang and Jarra explored means of tactical alliance with Alpha Molloh and Musa Molloh to reinforce their territorial consolidation.

**Political Crisis and the Early Mediating Roles of the British**

The continuous political struggle and resistance created an atmosphere of trade disruption. Therefore, there required a need for intervention for peaceful mediation. This also necessitated the
British government to assume a neutral stance in the management of crisis. In this situation, we need to contextualize the initial intervention of the British from the perspective of crisis management based on its recurrent and non-preventable nature.

In the kingdom of Kiang, Kaba signed a peace treaty with the British at the town of “Toniataba. We need to understand that Jarra was strategic for the British because of ground nut trade. Any form of intervention to avert disruption of farming and trade was necessary. The presence of British technological sophistication in the south bank of the Gambia can be relevant in our understanding of the context of the discourse of "technological-structural perspective" in the management of crisis. In this situation, the collective consciousness of technological power of the British administration became a catalyst for the management of policies and practice. Consequently, this also led to conformity and restraints in the crisis period. The British policy of a non-aggression pact, and the treaty signed to refer all the disputes of the conflicting parties to the British administration forced Kaba to remain calm. However, he continued to seek permission from the British administration to allow him to retaliate. He said, “I avoid the weakness of hasty impatience on your account. Give me a free road to the people of Cory-Kunda, Kabada and Jappineh (CSO, 1888).

In his message to the British administrator, Kaba illustrated clearly his main mission in the south bank region. He affirmed and disclosed his general outlook to the British administrator.

“I beg to say I have nothing to do with the groundnuts, where I am, I am only a stranger. Ever since I knew myself to be a man, my occupation has been a warrior, and I make it upon my duty to fight the Soninkes, who profess no religion whatever. if the Soninke of the north
bank had accepted the Muhammedan we could live in unity…”

In his publication “Shaikh Amadu and Jihad in Jolof,” Eunice Charles shows the practical commitment of Amadu to Islamize the people of Jolof with less attention to the establishment of political base. It is confirmed that Amadu and Kaba were all influenced by the jihad of Maba. However, Amadu’s use of wisdom and persuasive approach to non-Muslims in Jolof prevented him and his disciples from causing destruction.

It is even confirmed in the British record in 1880 that he was capturing Jolas as slaves rather than converting them to Islam. When the violence was intensified, the Jola captives who escaped from Foni rushed to Banjul to seek asylum. In 1880, the British administrator agreed to protect and secure the freedom of any slave who managed to escape to Bathurst. They informed all the chiefs that the runaway slaves would not be delivered back (CSO, 1888).

Kabada and Cory-Kunda were settlements in Jarra under the leadership of Coley Dampha. We can trace Kaba’s constraints in Jarra and Kiang to the resistance and consolidation of well-established centralized polities; the issue of alliance between Musa Molloh and the chiefs in Jarra and Kiang also undermined his success and the British treaty of non-aggression pact. It is confirmed that the Manding speaking Muslims settlement of Booyiba were ally to Kaba. The report sent to the British administrator confirmed that when the Fulas of Kabada attempted to capture one of Kaba’s children, named Nfali Dumbuya, but the Mandinkas and Alkali of Booyiba were able to rescue him. On the account of this, the Fulas of Kabada demonstrated their anger by capturing a woman, named Zeemi Sally, believed to be a sister of the Alkali of Booyiba.

The political alliance of Musa Molloh of Fulladu with the reigning kings of Kiang and Jarra can be rationalized in the context of rational expectation within the framework of political alliance system. According to Erik Gatzke the states’ assumption of homogenous perception mimics
interest and material variables. In this perspective history does not dictate inter-state alliance. This discourse is relevant in the context of the Fulladu-Kiang alliance against Foday Kaba in Kiang and Jarra. It should be understood that Musa and his father were the leaders of Fulani consolidation. Kaba’s nation building activities in Kiang and Jarra became serious concern for Musa Molloh and his father. Therefore, establishing strategic military and political alliance for common security became paramount for the allied kingdoms.

In 1888, the British endeavored to institute Formulative mediation technique in the internal political conflict between Kaba and the existing ruling houses in Kiang and Jarra. This could be described as a period that marked the pacific response of the British in the internal political conflict. Therefore, to avert war that might cause disruption to trade and agriculture, the British administrator deemed it prudent to engage in mediation.

In response to his complaints the acting British administrator described Kaba’s complaints as a demonstration of his genuine friendship and conformity. The British administrator further assured him of his determination to resolve the disputes. He sent a messenger to the rival chiefs to surrender his belongings in question. However, none of the reigning chiefs responded to the request of the British administrator. Among these rival chiefs was Mansa Koto who openly refused to deliver the boy belonging to Foday Kaba. According to the British messenger, “He said that he is not going to give up the boy unless Foday Kaba delivered his grey mare before he will deliver the boy back” (CSO, 1888).

The ruling dynasties in Kiang and Jarra were able to make use of tactical alliance and British protection as effective means to encumber Kaba’s influence. However, the correspondence further revealed Kaba’s tactical maneuver to provoke the British against the rival chiefs. The British report notes:
“After the departure of John, the British messenger from the
King of Jappineh, the people of Jappineh and those of Musa Molloh
attacked Masembeh for the purpose of stealing bullocks.
The people of Kabada also laid an ambush on the road
between Toniataba and Datore (CSO, 1888).”

The British report further indicates that Kaba alleged the people of Kabada for killing two
of his men: Faraba Ousman Fatty and Lamin Jatta. Another man also sustained an injury, and a
woman called Hanna Cham, a trader from Banjul, was captured. He therefore appealed to the
acting British administrator to give him permission to attack the people of Cory-Kunda, Kabada
and Jappineh. It was clear to the British that the people of Jarra were taking advantage of the
British protection to injure Foday Kaba. The people of Cory-Kunda even continued to collaborate
with Musa Molloh to raid settlements under the British jurisdiction. They attacked Booloofoolah,
and captured a boy belonging to Foday Kaba’s followers (CSO, 1888).

The Wars in Foni and the Early Warning of the British

Kaba perceived the British administration as a deterrent to his conquest in Jarra and Kiang.
While the administration was engaged in putting logistics for mediation between him (Kaba) and
the rival chiefs, Kaba and his warriors avoided Jarra and Kiang, whose kings and chiefs jealously
guarded their independence against him. He then continued to raid places in Foni under the British
protection. Foni was and still predominantly inhabited by Jolas who were socio-politically
categorized as egalitarian and stateless communities, governed by village councils.

Owing to the absence of well-established political and military organization compared to
the kingdoms in Kiang and Jarra, Foni was opened to vulnerability during the 19th century crisis.
The region of Foni situated on the south bank became geographically and ecologically viable for European and Manding speaking traders. The expansion of the wild rubber and palm produce also attracted migration into Foni for commodity trade. Foday Kaba and his men seized the opportunity to avoid the entire Mandinka settlements of Jarra and Kiang. He intensified his mobilization to subjugate Jolas in his drive to attain his nation building aspiration. However, Kaba became disillusioned when he failed to subject the Jolas to be inclined to his authority. He eventually embarked on constant raiding as an alternative venture for resource mobilization to sustain the services of his marauding warriors. According to the British accounts, Kaba and his men embarked on surprise attacks in the region of Foni. He returned to Sangajour to resume his raid upon the natives within British protectorate. On 11 November 1890, the people of Kansala and the kings recounted their trouble. According to the British report, “forty-seven horsemen attacked Burambang, the king’s town. They seized four women, two children and burnt some of the houses. They also continued to lay ambush and even captured a woman returning from her farm.” It was confirmed that all these people were sold as slaves (CSO, 1888).

The situation report of nineteenth century crisis in the region of Foni can be conceptualized within the framework of a human security perspective. The intensification of violence and continuous raiding created a state of insecurity for Jolas and European traders in Foni. This alerted the British administration to institute another method of intervention and mediation. There was a need for stable socio-political atmosphere for trade continuity and security for Jolas and British traders in the region of Foni. However, the British administration could not initially explore mean of military intervention as a mechanism to end conflict in the region. With the security focus on the threat level, the British administration in the Gambia adopted a model of manipulative
mediation technique in the course of terminating violent conflicts in Foni. In this mediation model, Britain, as a third party, contributed substantively to the negotiation.

Mr. Cater, the acting British administrator, warned him to be mindful of Foni in which the Jolas established friendship with the British. In his encounter with Kaba, the Governor clearly explained: ‘When two persons or people are friends like English with Jolas and other people who have signed treaties, do not expect you who say you wish to be friendly with English to go and fight our friends (CSO, 1888). However, Kaba continued to justify his attacks as a revenge of the offences done to him by the people.

The British report confirms Foday Kaba’s attack on the people of Kanfenda and Karoli. According to evidence Kaba justified the attack on the people of Kanfenda for carrying away his Jola maids. He also destroyed Karoli as revenge against the Jolas for killing his landlord’s son. In his reaction to Kaba’s response, the British governor justified the action of Kanfenda people as an act of liberating their own people from bondage (CSO, 1888).

The region of Foni Kansala became strategic terrain for British commercial interest. However, the militant activities of Kaba’s marauding warriors increased the threat level. The British mediation response for immediate restoration of calmness in Foni can be examined in the context of mediation dilemma. In this context, the intervention of the British as third-party mediator was to lay terms and condition for Kaba and his warring faction. This spurred the British administrator to go and meet Kaba personally to raise his concern over the state of security in Kansala. When the British realized that the disturbances within the neighborhoods could affect Kansala and their trade with the Jolas, the British administrator, Sir Samuel Rowe, made an attempt to put an end to the disturbances.
In 1887, he proceeded to Foni and found that the Jolas were tired of constant ravages. On 15 September, he met at Kansala the heads of sixteen Jola towns who appealed to Mr. Rowe to accept the sovereignty of their country and be co-opted under British protection (Archer, 1967). The treaty with the British signified that Jolas did not want to cede their region to any other power except Great Britain. Consequently, Sir Samuel Rowe was urgently requested to hoist the British flag. Two days later he entered into the same treaty with the chiefs and the Almami of Bintang. In 1888, the British entered a similar treaty with the chiefs in central Kiang at Kwinella (Gray, 1966).

They also appealed to Mr. Rowe to hoist the British flag in their principal towns. This treaty was not only signed by Soninke chiefs but also by marabouts. Mansakoto, an independent king of Batteling, also signed the treaty accepting all the provisions enshrined in the central Kiang treaty. We can therefore infer that Kaba’s conquest in Kiang and Jarra forced both Mandinka non-Muslim and Muslims to place themselves under the British protectorate for political security, while his raiding in vulnerable Foni also pushed the Jolas to recognize the British authority for defense and security.

The British administrator conceived it prudent to illustrate specifically places under their protection. He read the list of the names of the people and the town identified. This included the chiefs and five treaties. The person mentioned was Alo Barje of Bwiam. According to the British sources the signing of this treaty took place in Kansala (CSO, 1888). In Kiang and Jarra, the people of Tancrowal and Fonkoi Kunda voluntarily put themselves under British protection.

The British continued to reinforce the treaty of non-aggression pact as the only method to avert conflict. However, Kaba agreed to conform to the terms on condition that the British would leave the interior for him. The British governor turned down his request on the grounds that the request was meant purposely to carry out slave raid and plundering. This further revealed the real
purpose of his wars. As for Kaba, putting those viable terrains under the protection of the British would limit his chance of raiding the Soninkes. He therefore put it to the British administrator that:

“I am a Mandinka and he is a white man; he has got cash to live on. My cash is slavery (CSO, 1888). I am grieved because they left me and joined somebody else.”

Kaba and his people took slavery as the only means of their survival. Therefore, the abolition of internal slavery would be a threat to his existence and the new emerging economic phenomenon could only thrive in a stable atmosphere. Since his militant activities had to clash with British commercial interests, the British had to stop the existing commercial slavery on which Kaba and his warriors’ existence entirely depended. The British administration recognized only domestic slavery which was prevalent in Gambian tradition. However, the British administrator condemned commercial slavery as a repugnant venture to legitimate trade. In the correspondence, the governor reports that:

“I know two kinds of slavery: one was catching of the people to sell to others which the English would never listen to for a moment and it was no good talking about it, the other domestic servants that they took into their family or that were born & lived amongst their people. the two things were totally different.”

The British further refused to recognize his control over the towns in the interior because he intended to carry out raiding. In his reaction, the British administrator affirmed that “with respect to taking the waterside and leaving him the land inside for the purpose of letting him fight and make slaves such a thing could not be thought of (CSO, 1888; Mark, 2002).
With the lack of manpower base required for military intervention in Foni, yet the British administration continued to explore manipulative mediation technique as a mean of checking Kaba in Foni Kansala. Accordingly, the British administrator suggested to Kaba and his marauding warriors to engage in more legitimate economic ventures like farming as an alternative mean to raiding. Kaba then tasked the British administrator to advise the people of Bai to leave the road from Jappineh to Medina and from Koorong Koto to central Kiang (CSO, 1888; Gray, 1966). Foday Kaba and his warriors persisted in making trouble in the area. He returned to Sangajour to resume his raid upon the natives within British jurisdiction. On 11 November 1888, the people of Kansala and the king recounted their trouble with Foday Kaba and his warriors. According to the British incident report, forty-seven horsemen, attacked Burambang, the king’s town. They seized four women, two children and burnt some of the houses. They also continued to lay ambush and even captured a woman returning from her farm. It was confirmed that all these people were sold as slaves. Thereafter the British military expedition against Kaba arrived at Warambang. The head of Burambang voluntarily offered some men to assist the British expeditionary force as carriers, orderlies, messengers and guides (CSO, 1888).

The trend of depredation persisted. CH Harley recommended to the British administration the need to station troops to avert the continual raiding of Kaba and his fighting men. The British military mission suggested further assistance before the departure of Her Majesty’s Ship of war from the Gambia. This necessitated the arrival of 50 West Indian Regiment in Bathurst before the departure of “alecto” and “Widgeon” (Gray, 1888).

Conclusion
The nineteenth century capitalist advancement led to transformation and change in the production system in the southern Senegambia region. This led to introduction of legitimate trading system that attracted political struggle between Kabu and the theocratic state of Futa Imamate for effective control over strategic and viable geographical and ecological terrains. With the downfall of Kabu, new forms of power struggle and political consolidation emerged, leading to crisis that threatened the British economic interest in the entire upper and lower Gambia valley. The new phenomena necessitated the pacific and military intervention of the British administration.
References


